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Abstract
This paper examines the evolution of  economic inequality in Mexico in the last three 
decades, both in terms of  the personal distribution and the functional distribution of  
income, partly exploring the question of  how much of  its evolution is determined by 
economic or social policies. The second purpose of  our paper is to analyze the relation 
between the evolution of  the functional distribution of  income and labor policy, with 
special emphasis on minimum wage policy. Finally our third objective, closely linked 
to the previous two, is the examination of  the institutional context as well as the ideo-
logical and political economy considerations that have marked minimum wage policy 
in Mexico in view of  the successful attempt to bring the debate back to the forefront 
of  the political agenda. As such, our analysis will pay special attention to events since 
May 1st 2014, when the Chief  of  the Government of  Mexico City launched a national 
discussion on the urgent need, ways and means to renovate minimum wage policy in 
Mexico. In our view, this debate is perhaps the only recent expression in Mexico of  the 
current re-found concerted focus on inequality on a global scale, an expression that has 
woken up fierce opposition from key sectors of  the Mexican elite and highly placed 
government officers in the current administration.
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Resumen
El artículo examina la evolución de la desigualdad en México en las tres décadas recientes, 
tanto en términos de la distribución personal como funcional del ingreso, explorando 
parcialmente sus raíces en la conducción de las políticas económicas y sociales. El segundo 
propósito del trabajo es analizar la relación de la evolución de la distribución funcional 
del ingreso con la política laboral, en especial con la de salarios mínimos. Finalmente, 
un objetivo adicional ―ligado a los previos― es el de examinar el contexto institucional 
e identificar consideraciones ideológicas y de economía política que han marcado la po-
lítica de salarios mínimos en este país a partir del debate nacional detonado el 1° de mayo 
de 2014, que exitosamente logró colocar como urgente necesidad revisar la política de 
salarios mínimos para cumplir el mandato de la Constitución de 1917 sobre el derecho 
de todo mexicano que labore a tener un salario que le permita tener una vida digna. Este 
debate ha sido quizá la única expresión concreta reciente en nuestro país, por colocar 
―como se está haciendo en otras naciones― a la desigualdad como preocupación 
central de la agenda de desarrollo. Esta nueva lucha por colocar al salario mínimo en 
una senda de recuperación significativa y sustentable ha encontrado fuerte oposición de 
grupos poderosos de la élite mexicana y de funcionarios públicos de alto nivel. 
Palabras clave: desigualdad, distribución del ingreso, salario mínimo, México.
IћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ
Since the mid 1980s Mexico has embarked on a process of  radical macroeco-
nomic reforms aimed ―as the government has tirelessly stated― at elimina- 
ting the acute distortions in resource allocation brought about by decades of  
State intervention, trade protection and non-focalized poverty programs. As is 
well recognized, this strategy has failed to secure a path of  high and sustained 
robust economic development. In recent years there has been a revival of  
empirical studies on the evolution of  inequality in Mexico that follow up on 
the literature pioneered time ago by R. Cordera and C. Tello, F. Cortés, R.M. 
Ruvalcaba, E. Hernández Laos, M. Székely and G. Esquivel, N. Lustig and L.F. 
López-Calva, N. Samaniego and Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), inter alia. As recent studies have shown, the share 
of  wages in Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has steadily and acutely 
declined, at the same time that some of  the richest men in the world are Mexi-
cans, it is the country with the second highest number of  billionaires in Latin 
America (after Brazil) (Alexander, 2014), and where the richest 1% hold the 
highest share of  GDP, (Tello, 2010; ILO, 2013; Escobar, 2014; Samaniego, 2015; 
Oxfam, 2015).
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of  the percentage of  the population living 
under the poverty line and of  inequality according to the Gini coefficient in 
Mexico from the 1980s until 2012. A number of  stylized facts can be deduced 
from these crude data. Firstly, poverty is still pervasive in Mexico.
Figure 1
Poverty and inequality in Mexico, 1984-2012
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
Considering that the country, with a GDP of  US$ 1 178 billions, ranks as the 14th 
largest economy in the world (World Bank, 2014), it is a disappointing result 
that after decades of  economic stabilization cum focalized anti-poverty pro-
grams over 52% of  the population remains poor. Moreover, notwithstanding 
its extraordinary boom in exports of  manufactures, in 1980-2014 the economy 
expanded at such a slow pace that the gap of  Mexico’s GDP per capita vis-à-vis 
that of  the United States is larger today than in the early 1980s, a ratio actually 
similar to the one prevailing in the 1950s. It should not be surprising then that 
today more than 55 million Mexicans live in conditions of  poverty. The figure 
also shows that, despite some advances in the late 1990s and early 2000s, since 
2006 poverty has been on the rise again. Recent data from Consejo Nacional 
de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL, various years) 
confirms that the incidence of  poverty and of  extreme poverty ―measured in 
the traditional form of  comparing income to poverty lines― increased from 
2012 to 2014. 
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Secondly, inequality remains outrageously high, independently of  small 
changes over the turbulent past quarter century. Unfortunately, for decades in 
Mexico like in many developing countries, inequality was of  little interest for 
government officers, and also for the majority of  economists. Typically, it was 
recognized more as a challenge for social policy makers than as a key element 
that could have any important influence on economic growth. Those that were 
concerned with equality conceived it as a by-product of  the specific developmen-
tal stage which countries underwent in line with Kuznets’ inverted-U path. 
Given Mexico’s traditional fiscal weakness ―a tax burden under 12% of  
GDP, among the lowest in Latin America― inequality and poverty were tackled 
through income transfers and public expenditure on health, social security and 
education. This approach to poverty and inequality marked the radical neo-
liberal reforms put in place since the mid 1980s to reduce State’s intervention 
in the economy and open domestic markets to foreign competition under the 
assumption that economic growth and focalized cash transfer programs would 
pari passu ensure systematic poverty and inequality reduction. Also here we must 
note that in recent years, inequality is on the rise again.
Thirdly, inequality and poverty do not necessarily move in tandem. While 
poverty levels fluctuate significantly, our inequality line remains strangely flat. 
This implies that the strategy of  attempting to improve the income distribution 
via poverty reduction alone ―even when the latter is effective― may not neces-
sarily be sufficient recipe for success. For instance, the late 1990s saw a massive 
increase in poverty with a parallel decrease in inequality, while in the mid 2000s 
increases in inequality went hand-in-hand with a decrease in poverty. Clearly, 
therefore, explicit anti-inequality policies would be required as well, which so 
far have not been on the policy agenda in Mexico.
It seems thus that the goals of  poverty reduction and of  achieving high and 
robust economic growth have been very elusive in Mexico. Progress has been 
limited and far from sustained. Judging the evolution of  inequality, on the other 
hand, requires taking a closer look at the distribution of  the gains through GDP 
growth over recent years. This is what we set out to do in this paper. Its aim is 
thus threefold. The first is to examine the evolution of  economic inequality in 
Mexico in the last three decades, both in terms of  the personal distribution and 
the functional distribution of  income (Section 2). For this purpose we build 
and analyze alternative indicators, among them the Gini coefficient, the ‘Palma’ 
ratio, as well as the share of  wages relative to rents/profits. The second purpose 
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is to analyze the relation between the evolution of  the functional distribution 
of  income, employment and labor policy, with special emphasis on minimum 
wage policy (Section 3). Finally our third objective, closely linked to the previ-
ous two, is to examine the institutional context as well as the ideological and 
political economy considerations that have marked the recent struggle to raise 
the minimum wage to a level sufficient to at least meet basic needs, as stated 
by the Mexican Constitution of  1917 (Section 4).
Tѕђ ђѣќљѢѡіќћ ќѓ іћѐќњђ іћђўѢюљіѡѦ іћ Mђѥіѐќ 
іћ ѡѕђ љюѠѡ ѡѕџђђ ёђѐюёђѠ
Let’s first consider the personal distribution of  income.
Table 1
Income per capita in Mexico, 2012 
(in local currency units)
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5
Income (MXN) 461 887 1 180 1 488 1 843
Share (%) 1.5 2.8 3.7 4.7 5.8
Distance to decile below (%) - 52.0 75.2 79.3 80.7
Deciles 6 7 8 9 10
Income (MXN) 2 216 2 742 3 505 4 906 12 412
Share (%) 7.0 8.7 11.1 15.5 39.2
Distance to decile below (%) 83.2 80.8 78.2 71.4 39.5
D1-D4 (%) 12.69
D5-D9 (%) 48.14
D7-D9 (%) 35.25
D10/D1 26.92
Note: the Gini coeﬃcient for 2012 was 0.49, the ‘Palma’ indicator ―i.e. the ratio of the top 10% income 
earners to that of the boĴom 40%― was 3.09; the mean income was Mx$ 3 164 and the median one 
Mx$ 2 030.
Source: Krozer and Moreno Brid (2014).
Today, there is an almost 27-fold difference between the average incomes of  
the top and the bottom deciles in Mexico. This difference is in stark contrast 
with the average ratio of  10 to 1 in the Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) countries (OECD, 2014). More worrying, the top 
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1% of  Mexico’s distribution has an average annual income 47 times that of  the 
poorest 10% (del Castillo Negrete Rovira, 2012). How has this relation been 
affected by the far-reaching reforms of  the last three decades? Mapping out the 
income share of  the top 1% against that of  the bottom 40% (see Figure 2), we 
find that both the bottom 40% and the top 1% maintain the same share of  total 
household income in 2010 as they had in 1984. Thus, any potential increases in 
returns to education, or transfer income, for the lower income groups must have 
been matched by income increases in the top, keeping inequality levels high. 
Moreover, it is remarkable how close the top and bottom dynamics mirror each 
other, i.e. when the top percentile gains in share, it is to the detriment of  the 
bottom group, while increases in the bottom translate into losses at the top.
Figure 2
Income shares boĴom 40% and top 1% in Mexico, 1984-2010
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
Zooming in even closer (see Figure 3), it becomes apparent that the dynamics at 
the high-end are driven by changes at the very top; the richest decile essentially 
amplifies the underlying movement of  the super-elite, the richest promille, like 
a wave approaching the shore.
The data show that since the early 2000s, and particularly after the financial 
crisis in 2008, the highest decile lost some ground relative to its peak of  hold-
ing almost 42% around 2004 (though never falling below 30% of  total income, 
three times the size of  their population share and a level already obtained in the 
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1980s). However, the loss that the very top promille had to endure was much 
less significant. Equally, the large changes during the last decade need to be 
considered against the backdrop of  the official discourse of  the time, stressing 
decreasing inequality in the country due to the spread of  education and condi-
tional income transfer programs mainly but also as a, say, aftermath bonanza 
of  the economic liberalization, market opening and privatization having taken 
place in the two decades before.
Figure 3
Top income groups in Mexico, 1984-2010
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
Recalling the “flat” line in Figure 1, however, it seems that the indicators used 
to corroborate that narrative ―primarily the Gini coefficient― were unable to 
pick up on the more subtle movements at the very extremes. This is not the 
indicator’s fault but due to the ready acceptance by a wider audience of  a use-
ful narrative of  economically and politically cheap policy spreading the goods 
of  globalization and technological change to the masses, trickling down from 
the productive top to the persistently existing bottom by themselves ―told and 
propagated by an elite proud of  their own enrichment. 
Even if  there had indeed been a slight reduction of  inequality in the years up 
to 2010, it is far from significant and the levels may be rising again. All in all, the 
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reduction has been, in our view, insufficient. Indeed, by 2012 the overall picture 
depicts an economy where income is highly concentrated, and the bottom 40% 
not only holding essentially the same income share as three decades earlier, but 
also receiving only a third the size of  the share going to the top decile. Recent 
estimates by Esquivel and Campos trying to correct for the underestimation 
of  income at the highest levels, suggest that in Mexico the share of  the richest 
decile actually increased in the last ten to fifteen years (see Oxfam, 2015). 
Functional distribution of income
We consider now the functional distribution of  household incomes, which might 
give some insights as to the underlying drivers of  this persistence in inequality. 
For that, we divide household income into its labor, capital and transfer com-
ponents. Obviously, the distribution of  capital incomes is vastly more unequal 
than that for labor incomes, which again is more unequal than that of  transfers. 
Overall, the total household disposable income distribution resembles that of  
labor income, because this factor is by far the largest source of  income for all 
units, with the exception of  the bottom decile, where transfers are important 
(over 60% in 2010, up from just over 20% in 1984). Again excluding the bot-
tom decile, in which there are numerous cases of  “de-saving”, labor income on 
average amounts to over 76% (in some years close to 100% for some groups) 
of  total income, compared to transfer income reaching 20%, whereas capital 
lies between 0.6-1.5% up to the 9th decile (rising to 7.5% when the top promille 
is considered). 
Although this general pattern is maintained, and, as Table 2 shows, the Palma 
index for transfer and capital income is slightly lower in 2010 compared to 1984 
―i.e. the related distributions are slightly more equal― it is preoccupying that the 
distribution for labor income is considerably more unequal now than 25 years 
ago, both in terms of  the Palma index and its derivative Palma v.2 (dividing the 
income share of  the top 5% to that of  the bottom 40%’s).
In combination with consistently low Mexican unemployment numbers (be-
low 5%), this means that wages ―the major source of  income for most of  the 
population― must increase faster at the top than at the bottom. Thereby, labor 
earnings are increasingly accruing to the top end of  the income distribution, 
leaving the poor to struggle with ever smaller shares of  the income pie.
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Table 2
Income shares and Palmas in Mexico, 1984 and 2010
2010 BoĴom 40% Top 10% Top 5% Palma v.1 Palma v.2
Disposable income 13.3 31.2 20.2 2.346 1.519
Labour income 10.5 32.4 20.9 3.086 1.990
Capital income 7.6 52.5 39.1 6.908 5.145
Transfer income 26.5 24.4 15.1 0.921 0.570
1984 BoĴom 40% Top 10% Top 5% Palma v.1 Palma v.2
Disposable income 13.5 30.8 18.6 2.281 1.378
Labour income 13 30.6 18.1 2.354 1.392
Capital income 6.8 52.6 40.8 7.735 6.000
Transfer income 22.3 22.8 14.3 1.022 0.641
Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
How is factor income divided among the population? When ordering the factor 
shares according to population groups in Figure 4, we can see that the bot- 
tom decile virtually stops featuring in the labor income share all together (in 
fact, in 2010 it became negative 0.1%), while the top decile gains ground. The 
other two groups losing share are the second and second-to-last deciles. Inter-
estingly, the distribution of  transfers is much flatter in 2010 compared to 1984 
―the first and fourth deciles receive a somewhat larger share, but so does the 
highest decile.
Figure 4a
Functional income distribution in Mexico, 1984
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Figure 4b
Functional income distribution in Mexico, 2010
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
Thus, while both transfers and capital income are slightly more equally dis-
tributed in 2010 compared to 1984 (though inequality is still very high), labor 
income is more unequal now than three decades ago. Moreover, the bottom 
decile, which allegedly benefited most from the transfer programs, has seen its 
share of  total income deteriorate continuously over the past three decades, to 
a 2010 level of  but 0.8% of  total income, according to LIS (2015) dataset.
IћѡђџюѐѡіќћѠ яђѡѤђђћ іћђўѢюљіѡѦ ёѦћюњіѐѠ, 
њіћіњѢњ Ѥюєђ юћё ќѡѕђџ јђѦ ѝќљіѐіђѠ
The loss of  labor income share of  the bottom two deciles can be directly 
linked to the evolution of  wages in the country, and particularly to trends in 
the minimum wage. Although Mexico has been historically unequal, the current 
distribution is by no means an outcome of  a force of  nature or a necessary 
consequence of  its colonial legacy.1 Yes, Mexico was unequal in Pre-Hispanic 
times, and perhaps even more so during the 300 years of  Spain’s colonial reign. 
Equality was an inspiration for independence and subsequent struggles. More 
economic equality for peasants and workers was a key demand of  the Mexican 
Revolution in 1910. There have been periods towards greater equality in Mexico. 
For example, prior to 1976, there was a relatively stable relationship between 
1 The following part is partially based on Krozer and Moreno Brid (2014).
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productivity growth and wage growth in manufacturing (Palma, 2011). Their 
subsequent delinking under trade liberalization meant that increasing export 
competitiveness had little effect on living standards (ibid.). In fact, by the end of  
the 1990s, the average wage was only just recovering to its 1976 level, although 
productivity had increased by about 80% in the meantime; in the same period, 
the real minimum wage fell 80%, and the share of  wages and salaries in GDP 
fell from 40% to 18.9%. Profit margins greatly increased. And, all this coupled 
with several economic crises weakened organized labor’s bargaining power. 
According to Palma (2011), this “liberalization package” decoupling wages and 
productivity is the result of  political-ideological change in the 1980s. In addi-
tion, the abrupt economic slowdown in the aftermath of  the oil crisis vastly 
deteriorated the labor market.
Thus, two decades of  deep reforms aligned with the Washington Consensus 
―the 1980s and 1990s― contributed to stabilize a tendency to reduce the share 
of  wages in national income. The political transition from its traditional one-
party ruling authoritarian regime towards a more consolidated electoral democ-
racy has not altered this. To the contrary: as Figure 4 shows, the distribution of  
labor income is even more unequal today than in the early 1980s.
A number of  social programs were created targeted to poor population to 
compensate for their lack of  sufficient labor incomes. The star among them has 
been Oportunidades (now Prospera), a pioneer conditional cash transfer program to 
poor households in return for obligatory schooling and health checks. There are 
other programs, akin to non-contributive pension schemes such as “Seventy and 
More” and the Universal Elderly Pension in Mexico City to benefit the elderly. 
As indirect targets, they include the improvement of  the income distribution; 
their primary and direct focus remains on poverty reduction. These programs 
do have a progressive, albeit small, influence on income distribution. How-
ever, their partial success seems to have managed to distract from the disaster 
of  the wage share declines at the lower bound evidenced above. There is an 
ancient consensus that this decline is to a certain extent related to the specific 
policy by the Mexican government ―in particular since the mid 1980s― to use 
the minimum wage as a tool of  anti-inflationary policy that has resulted in its 
acute reduction in real terms. Such pattern of  decline in the minimum wages 
has tended to drag down average real wages at low scales of  the labor market 
where labor remuneration tends to be ―explicit or implicitly― set in terms of  
multiples of  the minimum wage. 
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Contrasting with these programs is the fact that tax policy in Mexico fails 
to have a significant influence on income redistribution. Indeed most OECD 
countries, with not markedly dissimilar pre-tax income distributions to Mexico’s, 
manage to almost halve the Gini coefficient in the post-tax income distribution. 
However, Mexico’s redistributive capacities through taxes are significantly less 
effective. Indeed during the last two decades, on average they have been unable 
to lower in any conspicuous matter, the country’s Gini vis-à-vis its pre-tax levels 
(Krozer and Moreno Brid, 2014). As Figure 5 shows, overall fiscal policies today 
are ill-suited to change this picture to any significant degree: the difference, i.e. 
progressive impact, between the pre- and post-tax and transfer distribution 
is only above 1% for the highest decile (reaching 1.6%) ―although if  the top 
5% are considered instead, this difference shrinks to 1.1% again (0.9% for the 
bottom decile).
Figure 5
Direct impact of fiscal policy on income distribution in Mexico, 2010
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Source: authors’ elaboration based on data from љіѠ (2015).
In short, despite the shift in the Presidency from the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) to the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and back, the massive 
increase in social spending as a share of  GDP ―including conditional cash trans-
fers and other programs targeted to the poorest―, decades of  low inflation and 
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fiscal budgets, the implementation of  North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)2 and of  a series of  radical market reforms, Mexico has neither been able 
to significantly reduce its high concentration of  income nor to boost its long-
term rate of  economic expansion. 
There are certainly historical roots that explain the magnitude of  the challenge 
but, in our view, the main reason behind the prevalence of  such stark inequality 
is the lack of  political will by relevant actors to change the situation. For some 
this reflects the assumption that economic growth will by itself  alleviate poverty 
and inequality. For us it seems more likely that the economic and politically 
powerful ones ―say at the top 1%, 0.1% or even lower percentages― refuse to 
lose in any significant way their economic and social privileges, and thus block 
any fiscal reform or policy measure oriented towards a significantly more pro-
gressive distribution of  income.
Indeed, this may be illustrated by the focus, adopted by the business sec-
tor, key officers in the Federal Government and certain analysts, in the debate 
around minimum wages arguing that Mexican productivity levels did not al-
low for higher minimum wages. This argument can be conclusively debunked 
with one look at the development of  labor productivity and minimum wages, 
respectively (see Figure 6).
As such, rather than being an inevitable and unescapable consequence, there 
are political, ideological and economic considerations behind the fact that labor 
policy in Mexico has allowed ―or actually pushed for― the persistent and ma-
jor deterioration in minimum wages to the extent that their value in real terms 
is today 70% lower than in 1980 and way below the line of  absolute poverty. 
Looking at the average wages in the low segments of  the informal sector ―like 
house cleaners, menial workers and taxi drivers― it is safe to say that the mini-
mum wage in Mexico currently stands below (not above) market level. Thus 
its existence does not create an excess supply ―as in 101 textbooks― of  job 
seekers. It instead produces a downward force that drags down their improve-
ment in purchasing power in real terms.
Clearly, the evolution of  labor productivity in the last decades, though far 
from spectacular, would have allowed for the minimum wage to remain constant 
or even rise somewhat in real terms. Moreover, when comparing minimum wage 
2  NAFTA signed in 1993. Mexico is one of  the most open economies in the world, having signed over 
40 free trade agreements.
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and labor productivity levels in Latin America it is striking that Mexico is one 
of  the countries with highest productivity levels (second only to Chile) but also 
one with the lowest minimum wages ahead only of  Bolivia and Nicaragua; two 
countries significantly poorer (Moreno Brid and Garry, 2014). Analogously, it 
has been stressed by key representatives of  the private sector that raising the 
minimum wage would be irresponsible as it would undermine Mexico’s macro-
economic stability and trigger inflation. However, the proposal to raise it was 
never put as an immediate three fold hike! It was put as an invitation to raise it 
soon to its subsistence level (circa 20%+ raise) and to think about alternative 
options to put it in a path of  long-term sustainable recovery. Moreover, none 
of  the opponents to the revision of  the minimum wage policy as put forward 
in the document “Política de recuperación del salario mínimo en México y en el 
Distrito Federal. Propuesta para un acuerdo” prepared by the academic taskforce 
appointed by the Mexico City’s Government (see GDF, 2014) have responded 
to the arguments there put forward, beyond finally admitting the need to revise 
the legislation that links the minimum wage to a number of  other prices and 
variables not relevant to the labor market.
Figure 6
Real minimum wage and labor productivity in Mexico (1991 = 100)
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Source: Moreno Brid and Garry (2014).
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The debate showed that significantly more attention needs to be placed to 
the highly ideological and political content of  the adverse reactions to changes 
in minimum wage policy as opposed to technical objections. Considering the 
applicability of  a new labor policy that would put the minimum wage on a long-
term sustainable route of  recovery ―as recommended by the technical group 
behind the Mexico City’s Government’s initiative― among other measures in 
the labor market for income equality, the main reason behind the reluctance 
and failure to apply equalizing policies is the lack of  will by key political actors 
and the economic elite to reduce income inequality in any way that may affect 
their privileges.
Tѕђ ѝќљіѡіѐюљ ђѐќћќњѦ ќѓ њіћіњѢњ Ѥюєђ 
Ѡђѡѡіћє іћ Mђѥіѐќ
Since the 2008-2009 international financial crises, the external market lost its 
impetus as an engine of  growth of  the Mexican economy. Moreover, not even in 
the period 1994-2008 when its manufacturing exports boomed, was Mexico able 
to achieve high and sustained rates of  economic expansion. On the one hand a 
vast proportion of  its manufactured exports increasingly consisted of  assembly 
products, highly intensive in imported inputs. On the other, trade liberalization 
coupled with the dismantling of  industrial policies and an appreciated exchange 
rate, weakened backward and forward linkages in Mexico’s industrial matrix in 
favor of  imported intermediate goods. Thus exports, notwithstanding their 
dynamism, were unable to pull the Mexican economy in a path of  robust and 
high expansion. In any case, strengthening its domestic market has become a 
requisite to stimulate Mexico’s economic expansion. Such goal is tantamount 
to the reintroduction of  industrial policies and of  a new development agenda 
deliberately oriented to have a more inclusive economy; to have a more pro-
gressive distribution of  income and wealth. However, until May 2014, when 
the discussion on the minimum detonated, labor or wage policies oriented to 
reduce income inequalities were a non-topic in Mexico.
It was originally Mexico City’s Mayor, Mr. Mancera who, in May 2014 pro-
posed to increase the minimum wage to comply with Article 3 of  the Mexican 
Constitution (Melín, 2012).3 Since then, the initiative gained such momentum 
3  Although Mancera’s was the first initiative to formally propose an increase of  the minimum wage, 
in late 2013 the PRD’s parliamentary group in Congress had promoted the dissolution of  Comisión 
Nacional de los Salarios Mínimos (CONASAMI), the federal Minimum Wage Commission. According 
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that, as the journalist Carmen Aristegui expressed, it can hardly be considered 
an idea championed by leftist or opposition parties only. Instead, forces from 
across the political spectrum, in apparent agreement, participated in a race to see 
which of  them could take most credit for bringing the topic back onto the public 
agenda (CNN, 2014). The right-wing PAN, who designed an alternative proposal 
shortly after Mancera’s,4 since then made a constant effort to claim the original-
ity of  the proposal, allegedly in line with the party’s founding principles. The 
party’s leader, then Gustavo Madero, declared that the PAN had not “stolen” 
the idea from the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), (Padilla, 2014),5 
but had in fact contemplated it much earlier and at least since 2012, when it 
was “included in the PAN’s electoral platform”. In the recent mid-term electoral 
campaign, PAN was perhaps the party with most advertisements advocating 
minimum wage increase.
In this process, the ruling party ―PRI― had to fight off  allegations accusing 
it of  joining the campaign for a higher minimum wage only belatedly. Notwith-
standing, the party’s president in Mexico City, Mauricio López Velázquez, denied 
that the PRI’s or Federal Government’s entrance to the discussion was overdue; on 
the contrary: according to him, President Peña Nieto (a PRI member) had been 
committed from the beginning of  his administration to an “income increase 
for Mexican families”. Mexico’s Secretary of  Finance and Public Credit, in turn 
stated in August 2014 that the “government’s stand on the issue was very clear: 
[to] support the debate on an increase of  the minimum wage, as long as [this is 
not] politicized” (Gómez, 2014). All this makes for a peculiar political landscape: 
How often in this country does something that can be highly controversial as an 
increase of  the minimum wage go eventually uncontested by any of  the major 
political parties?6 It should be noted that, the PRI and the PAN were not the first 
to congressmen Miguel Alonso and Alfonso Raya the minimum wage was “such a mockery” that 
CONASAMI should have ceased to exist (Melín, 2012).
4  The PAN differed from the PRD in suggesting that a popular referendum be carried out; this, the party 
argued, because of  their lack of  a majority in congress, leaving them no alternative but to seek popular 
support to avoid a veto from the majority party, the PRI.
5  “Let no one say that we are improvising or borrowing ideas from other parties”, said Gustavo Madero, 
the party’s leader. Later on he would also say that the idea of  a dignified wage was part of  his party’s 
doctrine since 1939.
6  Of  course, there was some dissent within political parties. In the case of  the PRI, Abraham Zamora 
from the Finance Ministry insisted that it is through a rise in productivity of  capital and labor that 
workers would see sustained increases in their wages, not through decrees. Within the PAN, one no-
torious party member and former Secretary of  Labor, Javier Lozano, called the initiatives a “trendy 
occurrence” or the “fad of  the moment”.
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to open the debate on this issue. Actually for some observers, they seemed to have 
jumped on this bandwagon once it was clear that a substantial critical mass of  
analysts and public opinion converged on the idea that the minimum wage was 
unacceptably low at a level far below the Constitution’s dictum on this matter. 
Arguably most of  them had an interest in joining the discussion of  a higher 
minimum wage in the face of  the forthcoming June 2015 elections. As Javier 
Lozano, former Secretary of  Labor and a PAN member put it: “Who wouldn’t 
want or support a higher salary?” As such, the struggle to raise the minimum 
wage implied, among other things, political capital.
This becomes the more apparent when considering the moment that Presi-
dent Peña Nieto chose to get involved in the discourse himself. On November 
27th 2014, at the two-month anniversary of  the disappearance of  43 students 
from Ayotzinapa in the state of  Guerrero (who remain unfound to this day), 
he disclosed a proposal to be submitted to the Legislative Powers for the de-
indexation of  the minimum wage, which in Mexico is tied to a plethora of  ad-
ministrative measures, such as the level of  fines and political parties’ allotments, 
among others. The current indexing system means that any change in the level 
of  the minimum wage automatically brings about rises in the level of  these other 
items as well, creating widespread discomfort among many different sectors of  
the population. Peña Nieto’s speech on that day was intended to reassure people 
and guarantee justice and security after one of  the worst crises of  the current 
federal administration, but then incorporated the by then already popular de-
mand for tackling the minimum wage issue. Eventually, despite disagreements 
on the particularities of  how to carry out an increase of  the minimum wage in 
practical terms, all parties seemed to rally around the need for its de-indexation 
(Barrios Fuentes, 2015). This administrative-cum-legal measure is needed so 
that the discussion on the raise of  the minimum wage could be held without 
the pressure generated by its coupling with other legal dispositions.
Along with a first proposal designed by scholars from Mexico’s public uni-
versities, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Universidad Au-
tónoma Metropolitana (UAM), Colegio de México (Colmex) and the Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), there were three further initiatives 
presented to the Legislative Power to delink the minimum wage. One presented 
by the Executive in December, another, from the parliamentary groups of  four 
parties (PAN, Movimiento Ciudadano, Partido del Trabajo, and PRD) in September, 
and the last one, proposed by Congressman Julio César Moreno of  the PRD. 
The lower House of  Congress approved de-indexation on December 10th 2014, 
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borrowing from and modifying the proposals of  the President, parliamentary 
groups and that of  Julio César Moreno (Cámara de Diputados, 2014). The 
Senate, however, failed to vote the initiative on December 15th. The formal 
reason was the departure from the House of  Senators from the PAN, as a sign 
of  protest ―albeit for reasons unrelated to the minimum wage―. Another more 
deep reason may be the rejection of  the elite to approve policies that favor a 
more equal distribution of  income. 
The support for the minimum wage was contested, however. There was 
some rejection, such as the one predictably expressed in August 2014 by J.P. 
Castañon, president of  the Mexican Employers’ Confederation, as well as that 
from J.M. Chaparro, a member of  the Mexican Chamber of  Industry (Cámara 
Nacional de la Industria de Transformación, Canacintra). Their arguments echo 
those expressed by most opponents: “If  the goal is to improve the income of  
workers and employees, this should be attained through productivity (…). We 
industrialists are more consenting of  productivity as a means for the betterment 
of  wages than doing so by political decree” (Luna, 2014). Others expressing 
similar and antagonistic views include the Governor of  the Bank of  Mexico, 
who said that “non-economic solutions” to low salaries, such as an increase of  
minimum wage by decree, could lead to inflation, unemployment and more 
informal labor. Interestingly enough, from its very first days of  existence, the 
minimum wage in Mexico is periodically fixed by a decree of  the CONASAMI.
Meanwhile the chief  of  the Mexican Taxation Authority (Servicio de Ad-
ministración Tributaria, SAT), Mr. A. Nuñez, stated that, to improve workers’ 
incomes though an increase of  the minimum wage would be futile, since “the 
only way we can obtain this is through more productivity and profitability, 
because if  the worker manages to be more productive, and the employer ac-
knowledges it, there will be an incentive to raise his salary” (Verdusco, 2014). 
We have seen above that this has not been the case: reluctance to increase the 
minimum wage continues despite the growth in productivity.
However, the most surprising thing about the recent political struggle 
concerning the minimum wage in Mexico is the fact that the debate has so 
far evolved with virtually no conspicuous manifestations of  support from the 
working classes. Just a number of  civic organizations have openly backed it.7 
7  Some statements can be found in the press, like a headline that reads “We will double our struggle 
to obtain a better minimum wage: CTM”. Notwithstanding, public manifestations and rallies, have so 
far been an exception, if  not completely absent.
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Indeed, the struggle has been carried almost in its entirety by prominent mem-
bers of  the political class, and a group of  academics with growing support from 
independent experts, and even some analysts of  major financial institutions. 
Perhaps the most startling evidence of  this is the fact that, in August 2014, the 
country’s Secretary of  Labor, along with Mexico’s important trade union and 
entrepreneurial leaders, made a stand against Mancera’s proposal and signed a 
joint pronouncement that stated: 
It is necessary for this country to undergo sustained economic growth and to 
remedy the problem of  poverty and low income through productivity and the 
reduction of  informal labor (…) we salute the public discussion of  an increase 
to worker’s incomes and particularly to the minimum wage but would like to 
make it perfectly clear that (…) this discussion must necessarily consider the 
increase of  productivity and its benefits (…) this is the only way we can prevent 
the reoccurrence of  certain past mistakes that taught the country, its employers 
and workers painful lessons.8
Among those signing the statement were the leaders of  the most prominent 
and important labor unions of  the country, including the Confederación de 
Trabajadores y Campesinos (CTC), the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana 
(CROM), the Confederación Revolucionaraia de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), 
and the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM).
This political curiosity becomes even more bizarre when looking at the re-
lated public assertions by other prominent individuals of  the private sector. The 
influential founder of  conglomerate Grupo Bimbo and one of  the country’s 
multi-millionaires, Lorenzo Servitje, for instance, is known for his previous 
critical positions towards left-leaning policies and the working class (Monsiváis, 
2006). Nevertheless, in July 2014 Mr. Servitje wrote in a newspaper column 
that the Mexican minimum wage was “ostensibly low and insufficient to satisfy 
the needs established by the Constitution ―an unfair situation that should be 
corrected as a moral obligation”, concluding that it would be both timely and 
fortuitous to further explore the option of  raising its level by a fixed nominal 
amount (Servitje, 2014). In fact he explicitly proposed a gradual raise in the 
minimum wage, not in terms of  percentage but in terms of  a fixed amount of  
8  Alfonso Navarrete Prida, Secretary of  Labor in Mexico, would reiterate these views on March 30th 
2015 in the national newspaper La Jornada (See Navarrete Prida, 2014).
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pesos to the daily wage, an image taken up by the PAN thereafter in its campaign 
called “dignified salary for workers” (salario digno al trabajador).
Other unlikely figures, such as C. Capistrán, chief  economist of  Bank of  
America-Merrill Lynch in Mexico, declared that an eventual increase of  the 
minimum wage was “probably inevitable”, although he also warned of  the risks 
that augmenting its level might pose for inflation and unemployment rates 
(Migueles Tenorio, 2014). Finally, economists from the Spanish-owned bank 
BBVA Bancomer presented a document entitled “Considerations of  BBVA Research 
concerning the Minimum Wage” (BBVA Bancomer, 2014), where they concluded 
that, although “the only way to increase worker’s wages continuously is through 
better productivity, it is advisable, based “on ample international evidence”, not 
only to increase the minimum wage but to do so in a single occasion, as opposed 
to a gradual, periodic, increase. Indeed, BBVA Research’s head economist, consid-
ered in a press conference that the Mexican economy not only had the capacity 
to raise minimum wages without affecting job creation or causing a surge in 
inflation, but could use it as a tool to combat poverty (Carbajal, 2014).
This cross-cutting panorama of  support and resistance to changes in the 
minimum wage policy beyond the traditional positions (including, prominently 
the lack of  support by unions, at least at first) is peculiar, considering the fact 
that Mexico’s minimum wage is among the lowest in Latin America. As stated 
above, in 2011 its monthly rate in dollars (US$ 112) was similar to Nicaragua 
and Bolivia (US$ 117), and equivalent to only one-third that of  Brazil, Chile, 
Uruguay and Ecuador (Moreno Brid and Garry 2015). This corresponds to 
only 15% of  Mexican GDP per capita ―the lowest proportion in nearly all of  
Latin America, and far from the 30% of  GDP per capita in Chile and Brazil and 
the nearly 50 % of  GDP per capita in Peru, Colombia and Costa Rica (ibid.)―. 
Moreover, Mexico is the only country where at the end of  the previous decade, 
the value of  the minimum wage is underneath the poverty line (ECLAC, 2014), 
and according to the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Global Wage Report 
2013, below market levels, even for unskilled workers. 
CќћѐљѢѠіќћѠ
Mexico’s quest for high and sustained economic growth during the last three 
decades has been elusive. As we showed in this paper, Mexico´s income gap 
vis-à-vis the Unites States is wider today than three decades ago, poverty affects 
 Inequality and minimum wage policy in Mexico        23
a substantial proportion of  the population, and inequality has not declined in a 
significant way from its alarmingly evident levels. In this regards the market 
reforms put in place in the aftermath of  the oil bust in 1982 have been a success 
in stabilization, leading to a low inflation and a small fiscal deficit ―but a com-
plete failure in boosting Mexico’s long term economic growth―. The slowdown 
in foreign trade and growth in the OECD brought about by the international 
financial crisis of  2008-2009 poses a major challenge to Mexico development 
and, actually, for Latin America in general. Indeed, given such a weak external 
demand, Mexicans cannot expect that an export-led growth strategy has any 
probability of  success unless it is complemented by a strategy to expand and 
exploit the domestic market. This option is simply out of  the question in societ-
ies with such an acutely unequal distribution of  income and wealth. However, 
the ruling elite in Mexico is reluctant to face this reality, and seems unwilling to 
put in place policies explicitly oriented to have a more progressive distribution 
of  income. Moreover, the country’s institutional system has been marked for 
some time by the remarkable capacities of  the ruling classes to co-opt union 
leaders away from any political movement or even fiscal initiative to create a 
more equal economy and society. They have so far succeeded in the last 17 
months in blocking the de-linking initiative on the minimum wage. Such result 
is sadly regretted on social, ethical and economic grounds too.
Raising the minimum wage significantly would have been a great step towards 
placing inequality as a major concern, as a key priority in Mexico’s policy making 
agenda. Sooner or later this will have to happen if  Mexico’s struggle for growth 
and equality is to materialize. One would like to think that now that the mid-term 
elections have taken place in Mexico, the Senate House will finally approve the 
minimum wage initiative and start tackling seriously the enormous challenge 
that inequality poses for our future as a civilized society and for our economy 
in its struggle to have a strong engine of  growth on its domestic market. Time 
may be running out to just wait and see.
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